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Abstract—We have investigated the application of 
Compressive Sensing (CS) computational method to 
simultaneous compression and encryption of gamma spectra 
measured with NaI(Tl) detector during wide area search survey 
applications. Our numerical experiments have demonstrated 
secure encryption and nearly lossless recovery of gamma spectra 
coded and decoded with CS routines. 
 
Index Terms—Nuclear detection, gamma spectroscopy, 
compressive sensing, data compression, data encryption 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ETECTION and identification of nuclear sources in 
urban search surveys, or verification of the absence of 
sources in wide area screenings, constitutes an important 
problem for national security. In a source search and wide area 
screening, gamma spectra are continuously measured in air in 
short acquisition time intervals (e.g. one second) with a 
moving nuclear detector-spectrometer [1]. Efficient wide area 
searches and screenings require a network of coordinated 
nuclear detectors. In such network, nuclear detectors would 
transmit the spectra measured every second, in real time, over 
wireless communication channels. Although the system of 
wireless nuclear detector network should increase the 
efficiency of source search compared to the case when a single 
nuclear detector is used, information transmission over 
wireless channels leaves the network vulnerable for a 
cyberattack. In addition, wireless channels may have limited 
communication bandwidth. Therefore, it is advantageous to 
compress and encrypt nuclear spectra for bandwidth-efficient 
and secure transmission of data. The downside of adding data 
compression and encryption layer is that slows down network 
operation. In nuclear search, measured spectrum is sent from a 
mobile detector to the central processor every second. After 
the compressed and encrypted signal is received and decoded, 
it needs to be analyzed in real-time to detect the presence or 
absence of a source of interest. Therefore, there is a need to 
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develop high performance data encryption and compression 
algorithms for networks of wireless nuclear detectors. 
Compressive Sensing (CS) is a computational technique [2-4] 
which has been shown to enable simultaneous compression 
and encryption of data [5,6]. In this paper, we are investigating 
performance of CS-based compression and encryption 
algorithms with eventual goal of demonstrating advantages of 
CS-based methods over the existing state-of-the-art data 
compression and encryption algorithms [7,8]. 
II. MOTIVATION FOR APPLICATION OF COMPRESSIVE SENSING 
A. Overview of Compressive Sensing 
CS is a computational technique that enables efficient 
reconstruction of information from significantly undersampled 
number (below Shannon-Nyquist limit) of linear 
measurements by taking advantage of the data sparsity [2-9]. 
A signal
n
R∈x  is sparse in the basis },...{
1 n
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nn
φφαΦx αα ++=⋅= ...
11
, most 
entries of the coefficient vector α  are zero or close to zero. In 
general, one can find a basis for most naturally occurring 
signals where the signals are sparse. In CS, measurements 
(samplings of the signal which results in compression) are 
obtained by linearly projecting the signal x on a set of 
measurement vectors },...{
1 n
aaA = , where 
m
i
R∈a  and 
m≤n. In matrix form, the measured (compressed) vector 
m
R∈y is xAy ⋅= . The requirements for CS applicability 
is that x is sparse in Φ  and measurement vectors in A are 
non-adaptive (independent of x) and incoherent with Φ[9]. 
Recovery step involves solving convex optimization problem 
with l1-norm minimization 
εα ≤−
21
||||..||||min
ll
ts AΦyα ,     (1) 
where ε is the tolerance. This problem is known as LASSO or 
Basis Pursuit denoising. Several methods exist for solving the 
inverse problem in Eq. (1) [10-13]. 
 
B. Potential Advantages of Compressive Sensing Approach 
CS method carries and additional advantage in that the 
compressively sampled data is automatically encrypted. In the 
CS scheme is the measurement matrix A is both the 
compression and encryption key. The measurement matrix is 
known to both the sender and the receiver. Without knowledge 
of the measurement matrix, the received signal cannot be 
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decrypted by an unauthorized listener, such as an 
eavesdropper intercepting the signal. Blind reconstruction of 
the signal is a NP-hard problem, which provides a measure of 
security against eavesdropper via the computational 
infeasibility of reconstruction.  
CS is particularly suitable for data compression in 
distributed sensor networks, where computationally 
lightweight coding is performed by a sensor’s on-board 
processor, while computationally intensive reconstruction is 
performed by the network’s receiver processor. This is 
advantageous for a network of hand-held nuclear detectors 
with limited battery power. Since CS combines data 
compression and encryption in one operation, this method has 
potential advantages in performance speed over the tradition 
protocols that involve sequential compression and encryption 
operations. 
III. OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR SEARCH DATA 
 
In this paper, we investigated approaches to encryption and 
compression of spectral data collected with Thallium-doped 
Sodium Iodide (NaI(Tl)) scintillation detector-spectrometer. 
NaI(Tl) nuclear detector is most frequently used in search 
applications because of its fast response and relatively low 
cost. A modern NaI detector measures gamma radiation in the 
energy range 0 to 3MeV using 1024 spectral channels. Thus, 
the measurement, or the plaintext to be encrypted, is a vector 
with 1024 elements, all of which are integers. Gamma spectra 
measured in air always contain background counts because of 
ubiquitous presence of primordial radioisotopes on earth. 
Radiation background measured by NaI consists primarily of 
gamma emission of primordial radioactive isotope 
40
K, and the 
daughter products  
Fig. 1. One-second background spectrum measurement vector 
 
of the natural decay series of 
238
U, 
232
Th and 
235
U primordial 
isotopes [14]. Measurements made with NaI detector in air 
consist of one-second samplings of the nuclear background. 
Because of low signal to noise ratio, one-second background 
spectra measurement vectors do not display distinct isotopic 
spectral lines. If isotopic spectral lines are detectected in the 
measured spectrum, this is taken as an indicator of the 
presence of a nuclear source. An example of a typical one-
second background spectrum measurement vector is shown in 
Fig. 1. 
In order to demonstrate isotopic structure of urban nuclear 
background, Fig. 2 displays nuclear background spectrum 
(counts in each channel) integrated over the search time 1026 
seconds. This is a log-linear plot of counts vs. energy, where 
the space of 1024 channels is linearly mapped to the energy 
space of 0 to 3000KeV.  The spectrum in Fig. 2 shows 
recognizable isotopic lines of 
40
K, 
232
Th, and daughter 
products of 
235
U/
 238
U. 
 
Fig. 2. Log-linear plot of time integrated counts vs. energy of the natural 
background nuclear spectrum. 
 
IV. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS WITH COMPRESSIVE SENSING   
A. Signal Compression and Reconstruction with Compressive 
Sensing  
In order to evaluate CS-based data compression and 
encryption concepts, we have conducted numerical 
experiments using L1-MAGIC software package operating in 
MATLAB environment [15]. One can observe in Fig. 1 that 
one-second spectrum is sparse, i.e., majority of channels 
record no counts. Therefore, the sparset Φ  for a one-second 
spectrum consists of 1024 spectral channels. Given that the 
original spectrum (in Fig. 1) x is a vector of 1024 elements, 
we chose the size of the compressed vector y to be a vector of 
512. Thus we selected a projection matrix A to be 512x1024 
elements. Entries of A were chosen as Gaussian random 
variables and the columns of were A were made orthonormal.  
Compressed and encrypted measurement vector y=Ax (y is 
512x1) is displayed in Fig. 4. Code runtime for producing the 
measurement vector y was substantially smaller than one 
second on a laptop with Windows XP.     
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Fig. 4. Compressed and encrypted measured vector y=Ax (y is 512x1) 
 
Next, the signal was reconstructed using the iterative 
optimization routines of L1-Magic. The iteration procedures 
begins with the initial guess of x0=A
T
y. Reconstructed vector 
xr (which has the size of the original vector 1024x1) is 
displayed in Fig. 5. The reconstruction error was ||x – xr|| ~10
-
4
, which implies essentially lossless recovery of the 
encrypted/compressed signal. Code runtime for signal 
reconstruction was approximately one second on a laptop with 
Windows XP.  
 
Fig. 5. Reconstructed vector xr (xr is 1024x1). Reconstruction error ||x – xr|| is 
on the order of 10-4 
 
B. Simulation of Blind Reconstruction of Intercepted Signal  
In order to demonstrate encryption strength of CS, we 
simulated a scenario in which an eavesdropper intercepts the 
encrypted signal y in Fig. 4. The eavesdropper does not have 
the encryption key, so he or she attempts to perform blind 
reconstruction of the intercepted signal. Suppose the 
eavesdropped correctly guesses the size of the measurement 
matrix A (512x1024). Eavesdropper’s blind reconstruction 
vector z (1024 elements) with a randomly chosen 512x1024 
projection matrix is shown in Fig. 6. Clearly, eavesdropper’s 
reconstructed signal z has no resemblance to the original 
signal x.    
 
 
Fig. 6. Eavesdropper’s blind reconstruction signal z 
 
C. Parametric Study of Reconstruction Error  
We conducted a set of numerical experiments in order to 
investigate limits on data compression and reconstruction 
reliability with CS. Using the original signal x in Fig. 1, we 
have investigated the reconstruction error ||x-xr|| dependence 
on the compressed vector length (sampling size). In this study, 
length of the compressed vector y was varying from 256 to 
768 elements (25% to 75% of the original x). Each data point 
on the graph was obtained by generating projection matrices A 
of sizes from 256x1024 to 768x1024. Log-linear plot in Fig. 7 
shows that there is a fairly sharp transition in reconstruction 
error from the value of ~10 (failure to converge) to the value 
of ~10
-4
 (convergence). This transition occurs at the sampling 
size of ~440 (40% of the original). In addition, there are 
several sporadic instabilities (sampling ~ 470) which occur 
after the errors transitioned to small values. Limits of 
compression with CS, transitions from large to small errors, 
and numerical instabilities are currently not well understood in 
CS theory. Since these issues are highly pertinent to CS data 
compression performance, these questions will be investigated 
in the remainder of the project.         
 
Fig. 7. Reconstruction error ||x-xr|| dependence on compressed vector length 
(sampling size) 
 
In the next numerical experiment, we tested stability of 
reconstruction for the same size compression (measurement 
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sampling). We chose the sampling value of 512, which, 
according to Fig. 7, would yield a small error in 
reconstruction. We conducted a set of 500 repeated trials in 
which different 512x1024 projection matrices A were 
generated to perform CS coding and decoding of the original 
signal x in Fig. 1. Log-linear plot of the reconstruction error 
||x-xr|| in Fig. 8 shows that the reconstruction converges in 
each trial. 
 
Fig. 8. Reconstruction error ||x-xr|| in 500 repeated trials with different 
512x1024 projections A. 
 
D. Simulation of Coding and Decoding Operations on a Large 
Set of Spectra 
Next, we applied CS coding and decoding to the set of 600 
one-second gamma spectra obtained in nuclear search. Integral 
of this data over time is displayed in Fig. 2. Using the same 
projection matrix A of size 512x1024 (i.e. compressed vector 
y is 512x1), we encoded and decoded the one second-spectra, 
Log-linear plot of the reconstruction error ||x-xr|| for each of 
600 one-second spectra is shown in Fig. 9. Although the 
majority of reconstructions converge, a few reconstructions 
fail. Reasons for these failures (either stochastic or 
deterministic) will be investigated in the future work. 
 
Fig. 9. Reconstruction error ||x-xr|| for each of the 600 one-second spectra 
To demonstrate the validity of CS-based approach, we have 
summed up reconstructed spectra the errors for which are 
shown in Fig. 9. Log-linear plot of the integrated reconstructed 
spectrum is shown in Fig. 10. The integrated reconstructed 
spectrum is very similar to the integrated background 
spectrum in Fig. 2. Spectral peaks corresponding to the 
isotopic lines of 
40
K, 
232
Th and the daughter products of 
235
U/
 
238
U are clearly visible in Fig. 10. In search applications, 
processing of nuclear spectra is usually automated by using 
radioisotope identifier algorithms (RIID). In the remainder of 
this project, we will validate the application of CS-based 
encryption/decryption in nuclear search by comparing the 
performance of an RIID on the original and reconstructed 
spectra.  
 
 
Fig. 10. Log-linear integrated reconstructed spectrum displaying characteristic 
isotopic spectral lines. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have investigated the performance of 
compressive sensing (CS) computational technique in real-
time compression and encryption of nuclear search spectra. 
Results of our numerical experiments have shown that CS 
provides computationally efficient compression and 
encryption of nuclear spectra. Future work on this project will 
investigate limits of signal compression with CS, sudden 
transitions from large to small errors in signal reconstruction, 
and numerical instabilities in reconstruction, and reasons for 
reconstruction convergence failure (either stochastic or 
deterministic). We will also benchmark the performance of 
CS-based methods against existing state-of-the-art 
compression and encryption methods 
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